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SUMMIT

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Further Reportage on Gorbachev in Geneva

Greeting Ceremony

LD181743 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 18 Nov 85

[Text] In accordance with Swiss protocol, an official festive ceremony to greet Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, was held this afternoon. At the building of the residence of the Swiss Government, the flags of the Soviet Union and the Swiss Confederation were raised. A military detachment was drawn up, the commander of which presented arms to Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. A military band performed the national anthems of both countries. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and Kurt Furgler inspected a formation of Swiss Army soldiers. The Soviet leader signed a book of honored guests. At the meeting ceremony were Shevardnadze, Aubert, and other Soviet and Swiss officials.

[Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1130 GMT broadcasts a report from Geneva by special correspondents Valentin Zorin and Boris Kalyagin on the arrival in Geneva of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. The report lists the following as accompanying Gorbachev: Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and his wife, Raisa; "E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister; Korniyenko, first deputy foreign minister of the USSR; Dobrynin, USSR ambassador to the United States; Yakovlev, chief of the CPSU Central Committee Propaganda Department; Zamyatin, chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Information Department; and Aleksandrov, aide to the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee."]

'Friendly' Talks With Furgler

LD181749 Moscow TASS in English 1736 GMT 18 Nov 85

[Text] Geneva, November 18 TASS — Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, paid a visit to the President of the Swiss Confederation Kurt Furgler.

Views on pressing international problems and also on the most important aspects of Soviet-Swiss relations were exchanged during the conversation that passed in a constructive, friendly atmosphere.

Mikhail Gorbachev stressed that the Soviet Union treats with invariable respect Switzerland's status of permanent neutrality proceeding from which it can facilitate in no small measure the further development of the all-European process, the conduct of a productive East-West dialogue and the strengthening of detente and trust.

Both sides have expressed confidence that problems of the European peoples' security could be resolved only through mutual reduction of troops, peaceful coexistence and cooperation between states, between nations.

The two sides reaffirmed mutual interest in deepening mutually beneficial links between the USSR and Switzerland in the political, trade and economic, scientific and technological, cultural and other fields.

Taking part in the conversation were Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, foreign ministers of the USSR, and Pierre Aubert, head of the Federal Department of Political (Foreign) Affairs of Switzerland.

Furgler Comments on Talks

LD181903 Moscow TASS in English 1845 GMT 18 Nov 85

[Text] Geneva, November 18 TASS — After his meeting with the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev the President of the Swiss Confederation Kurt Furgler told journalists:

"The striving of both sides to improve mutual relations was made more concrete during our meeting. We had an important and very fruitful dialogue. Touching on problems of security we stressed the existence of a striving for the present climate of mistrust to be replaced by an atmosphere of trust, for signs to appear again that would make it possible to believe that there at least exists a desire to improve the situation and a hope for a better future.

"We noted the mutual interest in strengthening relations between such a great power as the USSR and Switzerland in the field of culture, economy and sport. Bilateral ties must and can be strengthened in all fields

"So both sides envisage a continuation of contacts. We noted that our relations are good and that we have a striving for constructive efforts.

"This striving appears to me to be a good symbol and a sign for the near and more distant future in relations between Switzerland and the USSR".

Arrival at Soviet Mission

LD182137 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 18 Nov 85

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] A warm and cordial welcome awaited Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev in the grounds of the Soviet mission.

The CPSU Central Committee general secretary was welcomed by staffers of Soviet establishments in Geneva, Soviet workers in international organizations, and their families.

[Begin recording] [Gorbachev] This is home, is it?

[Crowd] It's home.

[Gorbachev, pointing to ground] Is this our soil?

[Crowd] It's ours. [Gorbachev moves close to front of crowd and speaks to them as they applaud]

[Gorbachev] So, hello. I won't go round [word indistinct] handshakes, although I would like to. [end recording]

[Reporter] Pioneers presented flowers to Mikhail Sergeyevich. [Begin recording] [Gorbachev] Well, great things are ahead. I shall not anticipate what will come of the meeting. Everything must be done in order that... [Gorbachev breaks off sentence to address someone in crowd] Much is to be done at the moment in our country — very much. Everything is connected, very closely — home policy and foreign policy — and in general we are living in a very interconnected world. There are many problems. Take the issues of war and peace: We must halt it; it is difficult to say what will happen if we do not. Take economic problems, ecological problems (?and so on): I know there are fewer of them in Switzerland, but they still exist.

Thorough preparations are under way for the congress. There have been elections in rayon and town party organizations. Communists are actively discussing [words indistinct]. So there is discussion with interest of all problems. This is gratifying. Probably the most gratifying thing is not simply that we have received support, from the point of view of approval, but that the involvement of people is growing — in economic affairs, in the political process, and in the spiritual sphere. A clear-cut [word indistinct] for the better is taking place. However, we also have problems, we are writing about them — I have added nothing new here. We have spoken about them openly. You know, we have spoken about them openly. You know, we have spoken of them because we are strong. We can say everything, make an assessment, and plan our work for the future; we can conduct things with confidence.

Our potential is enormous, whatever sphere you take — the economic sphere, the social one, the spiritual sphere. There is hardly likely to be another people anywhere with such an attitude to their country, caring for it, experiencing all its problems. Probably the most important thing is our people, with their dedication to the values they have gained as a result of implementation of the tasks following the October Revolution. And in fact, this is what all our plans for the future are built upon — on our people, both in the interests of their own country and in the interests of the world community, because in general it is now difficult to imagine any state being able to impose a policy such as would be totally based only upon egotistic interests, on its national interests alone. Here, national interests, properly understood, are the nub of the matter. Listen to our opponents: they always speak of national interests; but they are not living, not expressing, these interests in a vacuum. There are hundreds of other states and peoples. And it is in this interconnection that the optimum relations of peaceful cooperation are to be found.

I seem to be doing some training for tomorrow's talk! [crowd laughs] But that really is how things are. I am setting out certain theses; I am putting forward my thoughts, but in general that is how it all is. And I think it is easy for us, because at home and abroad, we do not have a dual policy. There is no dual policy. We have a single approach, an open and honest one. Whatever the weather is like in Geneva, we have to change the weather in the world for the better — change it for the better, for the better in international relations. We must not be captive to certain groups who like a cold war, a hot war and others — an undeclared war. We must be captive to the interests, so the true interests of the peoples of all countries. I think that the strength of our policy is in this: that we invite cooperation with all, and at the foundation of this are the interests of all countries. Of course, we will not reject our own interests, but we shall build them so that there is no detriment to others' interests.

So thank you for the welcome. I wish you successful work. Now there is work, work, and work. I have to get to work. [crowd applauds] [end recording]

Leaders', Delegations' Opening Talks Begin

Reagan, Gorbachev Talks

LD191006 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0950 GMT 19 Nov 85

[Text] Geneva, 19 Nov (TASS) — The Soviet-U.S. summit meeting began today at the U.S. delegation's residence "Fleur d'Eau."

Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and Ronald Reagan, President of the United States, met one on one. The Soviet-U.S. talks with the delegations' full complements attending will begin after this.

Shevardnadze, Shultz Meet

LD191052 Moscow TASS in English 1048 GMT 19 Nov 85

[Text] Geneva, November 19 TASS — After the face-to-face meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President Ronald Reagan in the Fleur d'Eau residence of the U.S. delegation today, Soviet-American talks have opened with the delegations attending. Taking part in the talks are Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR foreign minister, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and other officials.

Delegates Named

LD191355 Moscow TASS in English 1346 GMT 19 Nov 85

[Text] [No dateline as received] A meeting of Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, with U.S. President Ronald Reagan has started in Geneva on November 19.

First the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the U.S. President had a face-to-face meeting. Then the meeting was held with the participation from the Soviet side of: Eduard Shevardnadze, Georgiy Korniyenko, Anatoliy Dobrynin, Aleksey Yakovlev, Leonid Zimyatin, and Andrey Aleksandrov;

From the American side: George Shultz, Donald Regan, Robert McFarlane, Arthur Hartman and Rozanne Ridgway.

Talks will be continued in the second half of the day.

Participants Agree To Restrict Information
LD191158 Moscow TASS in English 1150 GMT 19 Nov 85

[Text] Geneva, November 19 TASS — At a briefing held at the American press centre at Hotel Intercontinental today, Larry Speakes, head of the White House press service, announced that under mutual agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, only composition of participants in the Soviet-American talks and their duration will be announced at daily briefings both by the American and Soviet sides. As to the substance of the talks, it will be kept secret.

The question as to what and in what measure is to be reported in the press on the substance of the problems discussed, is to be decided by the leaders of the two countries upon the conclusion of the summit meeting.

Soviets Stage 'Walkout' at Press Coference
AU181756 Paris AFP in English 1747 GMT 18 Nov 85

[Text] Geneva, Nov 18 (AFP) — A Soviet emigre caused a walkout by Kremlin officials at a Soviet press conference here today by accusing Moscow of violating human rights and by voicing the case of a jailed Soviet dissident.

The demonstrator, accredited journalist Irina Grivnina, drew instant attention from the world's media and the three Soviet officials presiding over the conference angrily walked out.

Mrs. Grivnina accused the Soviet Government of violating the rights of Soviet citizens and, surrounded by reporters and photographers, handed out leaflets in support of dissident Anatoly Koryagin, sentenced in 1981 to 12 years' jail.

Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Vladimir Lomeyko initially tried to restore calm.

Then, amid uproar, he accused Mrs. Grivnina of "seeking self-publicity that harms our productive work."

It was a "grotesque situation" at a time when 'vital questions" were being tackled by the two superpowers, he said.

Mr. Lomeyko, who is head of the Press Department at the Soviet Foreign Ministry, said he had "forewarned" the Swiss organisers of the press conference.

Yesterday, Mrs. Grivnina launched a similar demonstration to interrupt a press briefing by Kremlin spokesman Leonid Zamyatin.

The Soviet reaction yesterday, however, was far more controlled than today.

After Mr. Lomeyko and two flanking officials walked out of the press conference, the organisers escorted Mrs. Grivnina from the room and withdrew her press accreditation.

Mrs. Grivnina, who arrived in the Netherlands only last month, was officially representing a Dutch newspaper.

Arab Interests Not Subordinated at Talks
LD181717 Moscow International Service in Arabic 1530 GMT 17 Nov 85

[Aleksandr Bovin commentary: "The Middle East and the Soviet-U.S. Summit in Geneva"]

[Text] The Soviet-U.S. summit meeting will begin in Geneva on 19 November. All those for whom peace on earth is dear are hoping that it will yield some positive results and that the international situation will improve. People often link their hopes to the clear position of the Soviet Union, because the Soviet Union proves, not by mere words but by deeds, its readiness to contribute comprehensively to improving the international climate. About all this, there are those who like to use this historic and important event to escalate enmity toward the Soviet Union.

In the context of this campaign against the Soviet Union, the Middle East policies of both the United States and the Soviet Union are put on the same level, as are themes put forward on the possibility of a new Yalta for the sharing of influence in the Middle and Near East during the Geneva summit meeting. These fabrications and accusations are aimed at giving rise to the idea of a possible Soviet-U.S. collusion at the expense of the Arabs' interests. Despite the fact that the Soviet Union has firmly refuted all this, more unfounded rumors are being spread on the possibility of a Soviet-Israeli resumption of relations even if Israel does not relinquish its expansionist and aggressive line.

Western propaganda is spreading rumors to the effects that the Soviet Union is ready to allow 500,000 Soviet Jews to immigrate to Israel upon a request from the United states. All these fabrications and accusations are aimed at making the Arabs no longer sure of Soviet support and thus compelling them to relinquish the struggle against the conspiracies of imperialism and Zionism and for the achievement of the Arabs' interests. This is the aim of Washington and Tel Aviv, who are trying to cast doubts between the Arab and the Soviet leadership and are planning schemes of seperate deals with the Israeli invaders under U.S. aegis. It should be pointed out that the weakening of the struggle of the Arab front against imperialism by way of making fabrications against the Soviet Union and thereby rupturing Soviet-Arab friendship is a well-known method of imperialism, Zionism, and Arab reactionaries.

It is paramount on the eve of the Geneva summit meeting that we should recall the political plots of this kind just before the [1979] Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Vienna. They had convinced the Arabs of the fallacy that the Soviet Union was concerned with the SALT II treaty and therefore was ready to make concessions to the United States in the Middle East in exchange for that. The Vienna summit meeting was held after

the separate Egyptian-Israeli agreement had been signed and whereby Al-Sadat had needed something to justify his treacherous line. The fabrications about Moscow's concessions under U.S. pressure were a call to convince the Arabs that there was no other way for them but to accept the seperate deals.

The Soviet Union has not and will not abandon its principles of internationalism upon which it has established its equal and sincere relations with Arab countries. Furthermore, its principled stance of supporting the Arabs' struggle against Zionism and U.S. imperialism is highly appreciated in the official statements of all the leaders of the Arab countries, their social and political systems notwithstanding. Those who like to make fabrications against the Soviet Union should remember this.

Effect of Weinberger's Letter on Talks Viewed

Shows 'Internal Struggle'

LD191333 Moscow TASS in English 1324 GMT 19 Nov 85

[Text] Washington, November 19 TASS — U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger has ordered an inquiry at the Pentagon to find out how information on his letter to President Reagan on the eve of the summit meeting leaked into the press. As is known, his letter recommended the President to adopt a "firm" stand at the Geneva talks and not to agree to any arms control measures that would jeopardize U.S. military programs and its plans for militarizaiton of space. Most observers qualified this message of the Pentagon's chief as a direct attempt to sabotage the Soviet-American summit.

Commenting on this incident the ABC television company recalls that it was not for the first time that Caspar Weinberger tried to block the process of curbing the arms race. Not along ago, ABC says, Weinberger spoke out in favor of a "new interpretation" of the Soviet-American ABM Treaty, an interpretation that would enable the Pentagon to conduct early tests of space-based armaments. Eventually a more restrictive interpretation prevailed. However, observers stress, the administration reserves the right to return in the future to a "broader" interpretation which would mean in fact violation of the letter and spirit of this major Soviet-American document on arms control.

The Pentagon's chief also says no to those members of the U.S. Administration who come out in favor of discussing possibilities for limiting the "Strategic Defense Initiative" in exchange for limitations in offensive strategic armaments, ABC says. representatives of the administration in Geneva, particularly Robert McFarlane, assistant to the President for national security affairs, are trying to belittle the significance of these arguments. But others believe that internal struggle within the U.S. leadership has serious implications. There is no agreement within the administration, internal disputes are deep and the opposing sides have no intention of backing down. That is one of the reasons, ABC says, why people here do not expect the summit to make great progress on arms control.

Attempt To 'Torpedo' Talks

PM181836 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Nov 85 First Edition p 4

[Own special correspondents Ye. Grigoryev and T. Kolesnichenko 18 November dispatch: "Geneva: on the Eve"]

[Excerpt] Today, on the eve of the summit, it is apposite to recall the immense work and the persistent efforts made in the recent period by the Soviet Union to create a more favorable atmosphere for dialogue in Geneva. Constructive proposals have been formulated on the basis of which accords could be worked out given reciprocal good will; the honesty and sincerity of the Soviet power's intentions have been reaffirmed by unilateral steps of major importance. Measures such as the moratorium on the siting of medium-range missiles in Europe, the removal from combat standby of SS-20 missiles in the European zone, and the moratorium on all nuclear explosions made an immense impression on the public. On the eve of the summit important new proposals aimed at stopping and reversing the arms race and improving the international situation were presented for examination by the U.S. Government. On the condition that space is not militarized, the USSR is proposing to the United States that the nuclear arms capable of reaching each other's territories be very radically reduced, by 50 percent, and that the number of nuclear charges for each country be limited to no more than 6,000 units on the basis of equality and identical security.

At the same time, the Soviet side is proposing to the United States that programs for the creation [sozdaniye] and deployment of new strategic offensive weapons be abandoned; that the modernization of existing strategic offensive weapons be limited to the greatest possible extent; that long-range cruise missiles of all basing modes be totally banned; that all work on the creation [sozdaniye] of space strike arms be stopped; that the testing and deployment of new varieties [vidy] and types of nuclear arms be ended; that the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe be ended; and that a mutual moratorium be established on all nuclear explosions. The USSR is proposing on a reciprocal basis the removal from combat standby and dismantling by an agreed date of a specified percentage or number of the sides' strategic offensive weapons (for instance, dismantling 200-300 ICBM's each).

The USSR proposes that a separate agreement be concluded on nuclear arms in Europe. This approach accords with the wishes of the West Europeans, taking their security interests into account in the most direct way.

Pondering the Soviet proposals, a Swedish observer noted in a conversation that they "could probably be a sheet anchor for mankind." The Soviet position on the problem of ensuring lasting peace accords with the hopes of the public that there is a real chance for putting international development on the right track,

although the U.S. approach gives cause for alarm. How else can you interpret the fact that the United States, virtually on the eve of Geneva, has been continuing nuclear tests, has adopted a new military budget of record proportions, and has been expediting the siting of nuclear missiles in Western Europe. The implementation of the "star wars" program, which would rule out the possibility of radical nuclear arms reductions, is being obstinately continued.

At the same time, on the eve of his departure for Geneva, the U.S. President expressed a number of ideas about the impermissibility of confrontation and the need to "create a better and more secure world," promising to "lay the foundations for lasting peace." At Geneva airport he again advocated a "new beginning." We do not know whether maybe in the quiet of Geneva's Villa Saussure, where the President will be consulting with his advisers over the next few days, any specific amendments will be made to the U.S. stance and whether the necessary political will which would make it possible to give a joint Soviet-U.S. boost to the cause of ending the arms race on earth and preventing it in space will be seen in the U.S. line at Geneva. Will it be so? We will have to wait and see.

It appears that, despite the enormous efforts made over the last few weeks, Washington has simply failed to improve its image in the eyes of the world public. This is very disturbing for the U.S. side, and yesterday morning White House spokesman L. Speakes inaugurated a special U.S. press center in the Intercontinental Hotel ballroom, set up in addition to the international press center. R. McFarlane, assistant to the President for national security affairs, was sent to the international press center at noon as "the chief command's reserve."

Following *THE NEW YORK TIMES*' publication of C. Weinberger's letter which, as L. Speakes gloomily joked, "the President would have preferred to read on his own in the oval office rather than in this newspaper," something which many observers suspected and had been written about in newspapers, including our newspaper, proved to be a reliable fact: There exists in the United States a highly influential grouping linked to the military-industrial complex which is doing everything possible to thwart any talks with the Soviet Union which could result in the termination of the arms race and a radical reduction of strategic weapons. In this sense, the "Weinberger letter" (this provocative document will obviously become part of history under this name) is the landmine which extreme reaction in the United States would like to plant to torpedo the Geneva summit meeting. Judge for yourselves: The U.S. secretary of defense recommends that the President actually reject any steps toward disarmament, from "promises to continue observing the provisions of the SALT II treaty" to any concessions at all on the development [razvertyvaniye] of the "star wars" program.

While President Reagan was crossing the Atlantic, the scandal caused by the Washington "leak" which resulted in Weinberger's letter being published spread around the world. AP reported that when a high-ranking official administration representative on board the presidential aircraft was asked whether he considered the publication of Weinberger's letter an attempt to torpedo the President's mission in Geneva, he replied: "This is undoubtedly so."

At the moment Washington is investigating who was responsible for the "leak." But if you think about it, the fundamental question is something quite different. Namely, the fact that the letter was written and sent to the President in the first place. It has to be said that in the administration itself, to be more accurate, at the very top, there is no common approach to disarmament problems.

That is why, when R. McFarlane appeared at the press center, there loomed behind him the specter not only of the Pentagon chief, but of many of those people in the United States who are lobbying for higher and higher arms race spirals, for so-called "modernization" of weapons, for the continuation of nuclear tests, and for the creation [sozdaniye] of space strike weapons.

McFarlane was faced with the task of camouflaging and concealing the discord from the public. He tried to show that the administration is united, that it is experiencing "absolutely no pressure from the industrialists" (meaning the military monopolies). The journalists, especially the Americans, wore ironic smiles: A dead giveaway! McFarlane was all the more assiduous in his efforts to cast aspersions on Soviet policy, reiterating the tedious dogma about the "Soviet threat" and "Soviet military superiority."

But when your correspondents asked him point-blank, as they say: "Mr McFarlane, you claim that the Soviet Union is ahead of the United States in many strategic arms programs. Is one to believe you do not trust the estimates that have been repeatedly published by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, confirming the existence of a relative balance of forces? Or do you have one set of estimates for 'domestic consumption' and another set for propaganda?" No answer was forthcoming. When we asked him how his arguments about "switching to a defensive strategy as a result of SDI" squared with the fact that not only are none of the Pentagon's programs for the creation, modernization, and deployment of offensive armaments up to the year 2000 being curtailed, but, on the contrary, they are being expanded, the best Mr McFarlane could manage was to reiterate that all of it was "arms upgrading," an attempt to "catch up with the Soviet Union, and so on.

The Soviet side has come to the talks with honest intentions and in a businesslike frame of mind. A whole range of profound and realistic proposals covering all aspects of disarmament has been brought to Geneva. As a result of a sensible compromise tney could be an important step on the path of delivering mankind from the threat of a nuclear apocalypse. And if those who bear responsibility for America's destiny, which is inspearable from the destiny of the world as a whole, heed the voices of millions of people all over the world, including Americans, rather than the incantations of Weinberger and people like him, they will see that the people of our planet want one thing: peace and security, a tranquil, happy life for themselves and their children. It is time to justify their hopes. Geneva offers the opportunities to do this and this is the path the USSR is proposing.

Bogachev Commentary
LD181816 Moscow TASS in English 1759 GMT 18 Nov 85

["The U.S. Military-Industrial Complex Is Opposed to Accords" — TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, November 18 TASS — By TASS news analyst Vladimir Bogachev.

High-ranking officials of the U.S. Administration have not abandoned attempts at discrediting the very idea of the possibility of reaching accords with the Soviet Union on the issue of curbing the nuclear arms race and preventing outer space militarization.

Robert McFarlane, national security assistant to the U.S. President, in actual fact solidarized with the conclusions made by U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger in his recent letter to Ronald Reagan on the problem of accords with the U.S.S.R.

Responding to the request of newsmen in Geneva that he comment on the contents of the letter in which the Pentagon chief unequivocally urged the President to renounce the operating accords with the Soviet Union and not to sign new ones, McFarlane says that the old principles of deterrence, in action in the past 15 years, were allgedly no longer in effect. He repeated the absurd allegation that the Soviet Union had a marked "superiority" in the key areas of military equipment and, proceeding from that, demanded that the United States solve the problem of curbing the arms race by either reducing Soviet weapon systems... or by building up American systems, or by compensating these offensive arms with defensive systems, that is, strike space weapons.

McFarlane complained about the very appearence of the text of Weinberger's letter in the press, but nonetheless, described it as a show of "realism". In the meantime one cannot overlook the fact that even in the confidential messages to the head of the executive power of the United States which are seemingly not meant for the general public the head of the Defense Department permits himself to force and distort facts, while McFarlane, one of the closest assistants to the President, evidently, does not call the attention of his boss to that.

In his letter to the U.S. President Caspar Weinberger alleges that the decision of the United States to observe SALT II "could put rigid constraints" on the United States, and the U.S. would have "to dismantle between 1,320 and 2,240 MIRVed ballistic missile warheads, whereas the Soviets would have to dismantle only about 558 ballistic missiles, of which just 112 would be MIRV systems." Weinberger would not mention where he had gotten these figures.

It is appropriate to recall that SALT II limits the aggregate number of ballistic missiles with MIRV systems, not the total number of warheads on them, to the level of 1,320. Until now the sides have not achieved that limit. The United States can breach that provision if the Pentagon, disregarding SALT II, deploys additional MIRVed warheads on MX and Midgetman ICBM's and SLBM's Trident II. This is evidently why Weinberger does not like SALT II so. The U.S. secretary of defense is trying to scare the president with the prospect of having to dismantle the existing U.S. weapons sytems, but in actual fact, he is out to remove the barriers holding back their further buildup — the barriers, put up by the SALT II treaty.

Further, evidently in a bid to impress Reagan the Pentagon chief compares the number of U.S. warheads on strategic missiles with the number of Soviet delivery vehicles. It is like comparing the number of oranges in one basket with the number of stones inside the same oranges in another basket.

In another statement clearly designed for a propaganda effect — the interview to the *U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT* magazine — Caspar Weinberger alleges that the SALT II treaty did not provide for any reductions in strategic arms at all. Now, this is a deliberate attempt to deceive the public opinion. It is quite enough to read the text of the treaty and the report of the U.S. secretary of defense for 1981 fiscal to see that in case Washington ratified SALT II the Soviet Union, for example, was to cut it strategic forces by 10 per cent.

Evidently, Caspar Weinberger, McFarlane and other members of the U.S. Administration are alarmed at the very thought that the race in arms may be suspended and that the military-industrial complex may lose even a portion of its iniquitous profits. Hence, the distortion of the facts and the machinations in order to cast aspersions on the operating accords dealing with the problem of preventing the risk of nuclear war, and the campaign of discrediting the very idea of reaching agreement with the Soviet Union.

IZVESTIYA Editor Sees U.S. 'Undermining' Summit
PM181647 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 15 Nov 85 p 3

[IZVESTIYA first deputy chief editor Nikolay Yefimov "Focus" article: "We Expect More Than a Handshake"]

[Text] The central question today is whether we have any reason to expect progress at the upcoming Soviet-U.S. summit.

One can ask whether the fact that the leaders of the two most powerful world states are now meeting is not important in itself. And of course it is important. But the world does not expect just a handshake between the leaders of these two superpowers.

A great deal has already been jeopardized today. The current international situation can only gladden the military-industrial complex on the other side of the ocean. In the normal person it cannot give rise to anything other than concern.

Much, very much should be considered, discussed, and if it cannot be solved, at least moved out of the area of deadlock at this summit. Everything will depend on what intentions the two countries' leaders bring to Geneva — to solve the problems on the agenda or, to quote U.S. journalists, to "win propaganda points."

From the very beginning the attitudes to the upcoming Soviet-U.S. meeting have been different. In the White House persistent

voices were heard insisting that the meeting should simply be devoted to "getting to know each other" and nothing else. They should talk, shake hands in front of the television cameras, go back to their respective homes, and postpone the solving of problems until the future.

The Soviet Union takes a completely different view of the summit. Moscow considers that priority should be given to a businesslike and constructive attitude. The superpowers must solve the major issues and not the second-rank problems. They should make a maximum effort to improve the international situation.

Is this not what the whole world is waiting for?

If the two sides' statements have given ample scope for comparisons of their intentions, their actions have been even more revealing.

To create a positive negotiating atmosphere the Soviet Union has announced that it unilaterally introduced a moratorium on nuclear test explosions. The United States hurried to carry out its own nuclear tests and claimed without a blush that it "only wanted to catch up with the Russians," who had "taken the lead."

However, the Stockholm International Peace Research Insititute has figures which eloquently reveal that the "outdistanced United States" has carried out 765 nuclear tests. Is this a little or a lot? In reality it is one-third more than those who have "taken the lead" have been able to carry out.

The Soviet Union has also decided to refrain from launching antisatellite weapons into space if the United States also adopts such a measure. The United States seems to have expected such a decision and hastened its tests to hit targets in space. The Americans justified this too with the claim that they "are behind."

These and other Soviet attempts to demonstrate its constructive approach to the talks have been met the whole time by an open disinclination to show any willingness to compromise or for both sides to meet halfway.

But, of course, the key problem is reducing nuclear arsenals and preventing the militarization of space. The Soviet Union has made some radical proposals: halving the nuclear arms capable of reaching the other side's territory and totally banning space weapons on both sides.

In other words, the Soviet Union has put forward proposals in advance and presented a large-scale peace program. But what has been done on the U.S. side?

In response we have heard confused voices claiming that the disarmament problem is not the most important thing, that the most important thing is to discuss the situation in those countries where either the government or the political system is not to Washington's taste.

U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger spoke out most clearly on this point. In his view, there should be discussion of "...violations of human rights, the observance of treaty commitments, regional problems, and questions which affect bilateral relations and arms control."

In that order. Thus, the most important thing comes last.

It is clear from his agenda that the militarization of space is nowhere to be found. By moving the by no means most important problems to the top of the agenda and trying to conceal its unwillingness to take part in serious talks on arms questions, Washington clearly wants to undermine the summit in Geneva.

The next question: Will the arms race be moved into space?

In his replies to a series of questions from Soviet journalists,the U.S. President recently tried to calm both us and his allies with tales of how noble and harmless his program for space attack weapons is.

He is also — just imagine — prepared to offer his system to the Soviet Union once it is in U.S. hands and, if at that time both sides have no nuclear weapons left. But then one can quite rightly ask what purpose this program (SDI) is to serve if there are no longer any nuclear arms.

Once again Caspar Weinberger expressed himself a great deal more candidly:

"If the Russians were the first to produce such a system, an extremely dangerous situation would arise in the world. The U.S., British, and French deterrent weapons would become worthless and nothing would be able to prevent the Russians from carrying out a successful first strike."

So that was the intention behind this program. To be able to strike the first blow. But what if the Americans are the first to realize this program? Would an "extremely safe situation" then arise in the world? Safe for whom?

Here you have the whole truth. Throughout the postwar period the United States has sought and is seeking security for itself alone, at the expense of the security of others.

In Washington people do not realize — clearly there is a lack of political culture in comparison with Europe — that we live in the nuclear age and that everything is interconnected and dependent on everything else. In the nuclear age you cannot survive alone. You can only survive together. And being destroyed is something that we would also experience together.

In the last few days the U.S. President has come up with a "new proposal" which, according to White House watchers, was "cobbled together with the greatest haste." Unfortunately, there is nothing new in this proposal.

It is comprised of old proposals which the Soviet Union rejected long ago, since they represent one-sided advantages for the United States at the expense of our country's security. The U.S. President proposed that the number of warheads mounted on ballistic missiles should be reduced to 5,000.

Parity? In formal terms, yes. But the United States would want to keep its long-range missiles out of the upcoming negotiations, and U.S. production of these weapons is going ahead at maximum capacity at present.

Yet, it is extremely important that the meeting should take place. Moscow has noted that in his interview with the Soviet journalists President Reagan was anxious to vouch for the U.S. leadership's good intentions.

Reagan said, for example, that the United States and the Soviet Union should "learn how to live in peace." Moscow took particular note of this because recently we were hearing the absolute opposite. All these are fine words and assurances. What is most important is that they should not be different from the reality.

The world has reached a fateful watershed. Now is the time when we can halt the arms race on earth and stop it where it has not yet had time to get going, namely in space. History has given us this chance.

This could prove a unique opportunity that will not be repeated.

'Competitive' Spirit Out of Place in Geneva
PM181317 Moscow TRUD in Russian 17 Nov 85 p 3

[Special correspondents R. Kolchanov and Ye. Shulyukin dispatch: "Geneva, Avenue of Peace"]

[Excerpt] Geneva, 16 Nov — The Swiss, like all the inhabitants of our planet, are hoping that the Geneva dialogue will enable the two great powers to reach an understanding on the vital problem of disarmament. The Soviet Union's position in this regard is well known and arouses the broadest support among the world public.

As its many constructive proposals show, our country is guided by a desire to create the conditions for the adoption of practical measures which would make it possible to curb the arms race and ease the explosive international situation. It has put forward a number of new initiatives on the eve of the meeting which have received a broad international response.

The USSR has imposed a moratorium on all nuclear explosions and back in 1983 imposed a moratorium on launching antisatellite weapons into space. The Soviet Union put forward the initiative to reduce by 50 percent nuclear weapons capable of reaching the territory of the United States and the USSR. We submitted concrete proposals on medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe and unilaterally halted the implementation of retaliatory measures against the Pershing-2 and cruise missile deployment. The conclusion is obvious: the Soviet Union has prepared for the summit meeting with exceptional seriousness and thoroughness and already has a firm platform for discussion.

"We will be going for serious and productive work," M.S. Gorbachev stated at the meeting with the delegation of the Nobel Prize winners' congress, "and, I must say, we shall not be going empty-handed.

"The Soviet Union wants the meeting to actually promote the resolution of the central issues of our time — the consolidation of international peace and security, the improvement of USSR-U.S. relations, the curbing of the arms race, and the prevention of its transfer into outer space."

The Soviet position is deeply considered. Its aim is to resolve the really fundamental questions of mankind's present and future. It is based on strict observance of the principle of equal security and is not aimed in any way at securing unilateral benefits or advantages.

The U.S. Administration has had enough time and opportunities to give a constructive reply to the new Soviet proposals. To date, however, a clear answer has not been forthcoming. It is true that, in his speech at the UN General Assembly's jubilee session, Reagan acknowledged that no one can win a nuclear war and that the "Soviet proposals contain seeds which we must cultivate." His speech contained the promise to "try to begin a real process of reciprocal concessions and compromises." But the good intentions have received no real backup.

Many foreign observers give the impression both in their publications and in conversations in Geneva that the U.S. side wants to completely remove from the framework of the dialogue with the USSR those questions which put the White House in a difficult position. Washington is putting up a propaganda smokescreen and resorting to anti-Soviet attacks in an attempt to avoid discussing the paramount problems in Geneva — that is, ending the arms race on earth and preventing it in space.

With this aim in mind, the United States intends to shift the emphasis to other problems where, in R. Reagan's opinion, Washington can "score points." Thus, questions of "settling local conflicts in Africa, Asia, and Latin America" were brought to the fore in a clear attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of a number of developing countries which are defending their freedom and independence and repulsing the aggression of internal and external reactionary forces.

The point of the U.S. proposals is to neutralize the effect of the Soviet Union's actions on public opinion and to prepare it in advance for an outcome to the Geneva dialogue which does not reflect the peoples' hopes.

The practices of competitive sport are unacceptable in international politics. The peoples expect from the leaders of two great powers not the pursuit of propaganda points but concrete initiatives and deeds ensuring international security. Geneva has witnessed important accords, particularly on preventing bloody conflicts in various parts of the world. It now has a chance to write a new page in mankind's history when all the peoples' right to peace would be given definite guarantees.

It is not the Soviet Union's turn to act now. A routine session of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo noted that the main attention at the meeting between the two countries' supreme leaders should be paid to the problem of eliminating the nuclear threat on the basis of preventing the arms race in space and curtailing it on earth and emphasized the Soviet side's desire to

do everything possible to ensure the success of the Geneva meeting. This, of course, requires similar efforts from the U.S. side.

Preparation for the very important international meeting in Geneva is nearing completion. The Swiss authorities have taken major measures to ensure security during the talks. This mission will be carried out by approximately 3,500 troops and police. Not only the ground forces but also air forces have been mobilized. Private flights over the city have been banned. Controls are being stepped up at borders and on highways.

The city authorities have much to do to organize the journalists' work. More than 3,000 newspaper, magazine, television, and radio correspondents, photographers, and movie reporters have arrived to cover the meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan. According to AP, Ronald P. Reagan, the U.S. President's son, has been accredited at the press center where he will represent *PLAYBOY* magazine in Geneva.

Shishlin Previews Hopes for Meeting Agenda

LD181745 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 18 Nov 85

[Report from Geneva by international affairs journalist Nikolay Shishlin]

[Text] The Soviet-U.S. summit starts tomorrow; but the problems which will be discussed in the course of this responsible meeting are no secret to journalists. Well, first there is the question of the limitation and reduction of the arms race and the prevention of the militarization of space — to speak more precisely, the prevention of the siting [razmeshcheniye] of weapons in space. It is obvious that in the course of the meeting, the so-called regional problems which naturally play a significant role in the general state of present international relations, will also be touched upon.

And it is also obvious that in the course of the meeting problems such as bilateral Soviet-U.S. relations will be touched upon, and it looks as if those problems which fall within the framework of the Helsinki so-called third basket agreement — that is questions about contacts in the sphere of culture, about the human rights and so on — will also be touched upon to a certain extent.

On the eve of the summit, the positions of both sides have been more or less outlined. And once more, the arrival of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev in Geneva and his statement at the airport has met with a vivid interest and understanding, since the USSR has demonstrated its serious and responsible approach to this meeting not only by words but also by deeds.

And this concerns of course the key problem of our times: namely, the problem of curtailing the arms race and preventing the transfer of arms into space. And if the USSR has at the present time quite definitely stated its aspiration to seek reasonable compromises on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security for both sides, if the firm will of the USSR for peace is fortified by a no less firm will to seek really reasonable compromises, equal and only equal, then as far as the U.S. position is concerned, it must become revealed in the course of these 2 upcoming tense days in Geneva.

Soviet Observers Cited on Outlook for Talks

PM181529 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 19 Nov 85 First Edition p 3

[Special correspondent Mikhail Ozerov report: "At the Center of Attention"]

[Text] Geneva — Geneva's international information center becomes busier every day, and on the eve of the start of the summit meeting the huge building is full to overflowing. From morning till night, briefings and press conferences are held here, typewriters clatter, and teleprinters report the latest news from various parts of the globe.

The street outside the building is also busy. Cars are parked two or three deep, although the rules strictly forbid it. The people of Geneva, by their own account, cannot remember such an influx of guests. Approximately 4,000 journalists alone are accredited here.

Naturally, these days everyone is interested in the most important question: What have the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States brought with them and what do they intend to place on the conference table?

Of course, it is still too soon to give an answer. But the latest statements by the two countries' representatives and press articles on the main problem — disarmament — are considered indicative here.

The press conference of R. McFarlane, the U.S. President's national security adviser, who is here as part of the U.S. delegation, lasted an hour. The essence of what he said is: The USSR is greatly superior to the United States in the arms sphere. In proving this, McFarlane looked more like a conjurer than a statesman: He produced from goodness knows where improbable figures which have nothing in common with reality. This was done in order to convince those present that the poor United States has no choice left but to arm itself rapidly, and in particular to embark on the implementation of the SDI — the White House's "Strategic Defense Initiative."

People in the international information center comment with indignation on passages from another official from the banks of the Potomac. Correspondents have calculated that Caspar Weinberger's letter to the U.S. President, which was published in *THE NEW YORK TIMES* and disseminated here, repeats the word "violations" more than 20 times. But of course, not on the part of the United States. The defense secretary asserts that the Soviet Union is violating existing arms accords and thereby placing Washington in a "vulnerable and dangerous situation" which requires resolute actions in response. Journalistic circles here have assessed the U.S. defense secretary's letter as gross pressure on the President before the start of the Geneva meeting.

The opinion of the well-known Swiss television commentator Erich (Gisling) is of interest. In a special program on the summit meeting, he said that "all weapons are used in the propaganda war being waged by the United States in connection with the talks." Analyzing the U.S. stance, the local newspaper *DER BUND* writes of "contradictory proposals on disarmament questions made by President Reagan on the threshold of Geneva."

And what is the opinion of the prominent Soviet scientists and specialists who are here now?

"Remarks like those in Weinberger's letter," Academician G. Arbatov believes, "are a direct attempt to torpedo the arms limitation process and hinder the success of the summit talks. The U.S. defense secretary has openly admitted what we supposed: Certain groups -- influential groups — in the U.S. Government want to destroy any possibilities of achieving disarmament accords."

Colonel General N. Chervov stresses that the Soviet Union holds precisely the opposite position. In preparing for the Geneva meeting, our interlocutor recalls, our country submitted for U.S. examination constructive, far-reaching proposals which take account of the interests of all sides, and not only the United States and the Soviet Union, but also Western Europe. The aim of the proposals is this: to achieve a breakthrough in favor of strengthening peace, security, and cooperation and to create fundamentally new relations between the Soviet Union and the United States.

"However," Chervov says, "Washington unfortunately does not display a constructive approach. It hurries to deploy its Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in Western Europe as quickly as possible, carries out one nuclear explosion after another, and creates first nuclear strike means. By all appearances the U.S. counterproposals made in response to our initiatives deal not with a reduction, but a buildup of strategic arms and the preservation of all U.S. military programs. And perhaps most important, they bypass the most fundamental problem: a ban on space strike arms and the ending of 'star wars' preparations."

...On arriving in Geneva, Ronald Reagan came out in favor of a "new start" in Soviet-U.S. relations. Good words, but where will they lead in concrete terms? Everyone would like to believe that behind the U.S. President's statement are sincerity and the intention to take peace-loving steps. The next 2 days will show whether this is so.

Panel Discusses Geneva Summit, U.S. Policy

LD182031 Moscow in English to North America 0001 GMT 18 Nov 85

[From the "Top Priority" panel discussion program presented by host Vladimir Posner with Drs Bogdanov and Plekhanov from the United States of America and Canada Institute — live or recorded]

[Text] [Posner] Today I'd like to take a look at the update of the Communist Party Program that was recently published — it was published on 26 October in all the national dailies in the Soviet Union — and specifically the part of it that looks at international relations, and even more specifically, the part of it that looks at relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Now what it says is that the Soviet Communist Party stands for normal, stable relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Many Americans might see this, and probably do see this, as a typical propaganda statement. Now do we have any reason to believe — or should we say, should Americans have reason to believe — that this is not a propaganda statement? That it has behind it something more than an attempt to, as they say in America, con the public? Dr Bogdanov.

[Bogdanov] As a party member I give a very big, a great importance to the chapter of the program which deals with our foreign policy and with the Soviet-American relations. By the way, Vladimir, if you compare the previous program with this program, you will see that Soviet-American relations in this new edition have taken very prominent place, very important place, and I understand why — because we have now a great big experience of dealing with USA at two stages, let me put it like that. [sentence as heard] Now, the first stage is detente or whatever you call it, 10 years of normal development; and the other stage is the stage of worsening, progressive worsening of the Soviet-American relations for the last 5 years. And we realize, we understand that the Soviet-American relations, (?albeit) it's not the beginning and end of everything, it's a very important part of the international structure. Better Soviet-American relations, more stable, more quiet international structure and the less danger of nuclear war because by God's design it happens so that the USSR and the USA are in possession of the biggest nuclear arsenals which are capable to destroy not only each other but the whole world. So if I were in my...at the other end I would rather pay very big attention to that document and to be quite serious of studying it.

[Posner] Dr Bogdanov, this is a different question, but our listeners might be surprised to hear a Communist say by God's design.

[Bogdanov] Well, I don't see it's surprising that I say by God's design. We Russians, we've been living with God for so many centuries, for so many...

[Posner interrupts] ...that it's stayed in the language.

[Bogdanov] Yes, it's like, you know, there is nothing.

[Posner] OK.

[Bogdanov] (?There is nothing).

[Posner] Just for our American. Yes, Dr Plekhanov, did you want to add something to that? If not, then I would simply like to continue along the same way. What I was thinking of — does an American looking back over our relations have reason to believe that indeed we are interested in stable relations with the United States, and that this is a policy that is a...has a long standing to it?

[Plekhanov] Oh, of course, the relations between the Soviet Government and the United States were broken virtually on the

moment that the Soviet Government was formed in 1917 and it was not done by the Soviet side. The United States simply refused to recognize the new system in the Soviet...in Russia for 16 years, up until 1933. During all that period we maintained that it was in the interests of both sides to reestablish diplomatic relations, to have good cooperative, normal relations despite the differences in ideologies and political systems. Since 1933 we have had our ups and downs. We have had all kinds of relations. During the Second World War, of course, we were allies, and that was a very important period in our relations. And it was not our responsibility, we were not to blame for the starting of the cold war. The United States thought that it could gain advantage from a policy of pressure on the Soviet Union, considering the Soviet Union weakened by the war, unable to respond, unable to compete with the United States in equal terms. And it was only when a policy a pressure, a policy of the cold war, began to be exposed as a policy of failure in Soviet-American relations that the United States was in the mood for some changes and the thawing of the cold war began in the 1950s and in the 1960s there was a movement toward a better relationship. It was marred to a great extent by the war in Vietnam. But by the late 1960s both sides were ready for a new mode of relationship and, of course detente started. We consider it a very unhappy development that after several years of detente we slid back to a relationship more characterized by a cold war type of relations. And therefore I think it's important in terms of doctrine, in terms of Soviet ideology, party ideology, that detente is formulated in this new program — the new update of the CPSU Program — as the kind of relations between East and West that we should work to.

[Posner] I might ask you a question. I might say, okay, we have tried to have stable relations with the United States, but if you look at the United States' policy it's always zigzagging. We never know where we stand with them. Today it's warm, tomorrow it's cold, and the day after that it's lukewarm. Today they say one thing, tomorrow they say another thing. Can we hope to have stable relations with the United States? Isn't this desire somewhat idealistic?

[Bogdanov] It's very human question, but as a professional I put the same question to myself and, to be frank with you, so far I have no answer. But I know one thing: USA is a great country, it's a great people, with great achievements, it's a great civilization, and you have to live with them on this earth. That's the fact, you like them or dislike, you cannot fly to the moon just because you don't like them. And, of course, I agree with you, how it is difficult for us to plan accordingly our relations with USA when they have...every 2 years they change their House; every 4 years they elect their president, every 6 years they reelect their Senate. And every time we have a difficulty because 1 year before elections or reelections they paralyze their policy, you know, they are busy with their domestic business and we understand that, but we cannot change that, that is their own domestic (?program) but it really makes everything difficult. But in any case you have to — that's really, you have no option and I hope that the other side thinks along the same lines.

[Plekhanov] I would like to add something to that. I don't think that this should be seen as an indictment of the American electoral system. It's not the elections themselves that are to blame for this fickleness of American behavior.

[Bogdanov] Yes, of course, you are right.

[Plekhanov] And, you know, the political elite, the decision-makers, for some reason they use the election campaigns in order to generate some very very irresponsible tendencies in American politics. That has happened in the cold war, that has happened in the sixties, that has happened in the recent years when detente began to unravel. I think that reflects only one thing: not the — some — faults of the American political system, it reflects faults of the elite's thinking, that they are not responsible enough when they deal with Soviet-American relations. They should not play political football with such important things as Soviet-American relations.

[Bogdanov] And you know, there is another thing: sometimes Soviet-American relations become a hostage of American domestic policy, you know.

[Plekhanov] Yes, well, sure.

[Bogdanov] That's very, very dangerous and very unproductive part. [sentence as received]

[Plekhanov] (?No, it...)

[Bogdanov] It spoils, it spoils, literally speaking, everything.

[Posner] I agree with that. The update says, among other things, that the difference in social systems and in ideologies is not a reason for tension in our relationship. Now, as an American hardliner, I say how can you say that when, on the other hand, you keep saying that the two ideologies are simply diametrically opposed and cannot find common ground. Now would you please explain? Isn't there some kind of lack of logic in this?

[Bogdanov] No, there is no lack of logic. It's quite logical that we are different society with different values and with different ideology. Does it mean that we should eat up each other? No, it doesn't mean. There is very...one very major, very important, and very simple condition. Please, for heaven's sake, don't bring your ideological differences to the structure of international state-to-state relations; that's number one. Number two: You know, all our troubles start when we are trying to teach each other how to behave and to change each other, and we believe, at least I mean at the other end they believe that without changing our society no peace is possible. That may...

[Posner] May I interrupt you just for 1 minute?

[Bogdanov] Yes.

[Posner] This is very interesting.

[Bogdanov] Yes.

[Posner] The thing that you've touched on. I was told by an American diplomat, whose name I cannot use today, that he had read that American policy was to change the Soviet system.

[Bogdanov] Oh, yes, it's not a secret. There are a lotof Americans in the — in some, in some circles, and very important, even ruling circles, even in the administration, they are really aiming at changing our society. And they state, and by the way they state sometimes publicly, that without changing the roots of our society no peace is possible between the USA and USSR. Now what is the...what does it imply? It implies that if you wage a war, a nuclear war against the USSR, you will be doing it in the name of peace because the logic is that without destroying them you cannot establish peaceful relations between USSR and USA. I don't feel like explaining that to my American listeners, how it is difficult for us to digest that, how it makes our suspicions about American policy toward us really ominous suspicions, what they are up to.

[Plekhanov] I would like to stress that ideological differences between states need not lead to armed confrontation between them. In fact, if you look at the history of the 20th century, you will not find much evidence that difference between — the ideolgocal differences between — socialism and capitalism should degenerate into a war. The First World War started as an intra-Western war between states whch had similar economic and social and ideological systems. The Second World War started because Germany wanted to conquer the world. Their conquest of the Soviet Union was part of their master plan, but the war started as, again, a war between capitalist states; and what's more, it ended with major capitalist states teamed up together with a socialist state, the Soviet Union, in a coalition against those who simply wanted to make the world their colony.

[Posner] All right. With time running out I'd like to ask one final question. As you certainly know, this update of the Party Program was published in all national dailies, as I said, and therefore it is addressed not only to party members of which we have 18 million, but to all Soviet citizens with the specific idea of having more people — as many people as possible — comment, state their views, what they like about it, what they dislike, what they would like to see added, and so on and so forth. In this particular area of relationship with the United States, of the stated goal of normal and stable relations, do you believe that this part of the Party Program will indeed receive support from the vast majority of, a significant number of, Soviet citizens? Does this reflect not only party desire, but popular desire? What is your feeling about this?

[Bogdanov] My feeling is one-sided absolutely, that we will have all-out support of the Soviet people.

[Plekhanov] Well, that of course doesn't mean that people idealize the United States, although I would say that there is a little bit of that.

[Bogdanov] No.

[Plekhanov] Because, you know, Americans are so good at public relations, at advertising, Madison Avenue technique, I would say, and really people are able, people in the street are able to distinguish between policies of an American Government and the aspirations and attitudes of the American people. I think that distinction is very important.

[Posner] Thank you very much, Dr Plekhanov, Dr Bogdanov.

Soviet Stance, Proposals Aimed at 'Agreement'

LD191447 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0700 GMT 19 Nov 85

[Report by international affairs journalist Nikolay Shishlin from Geneva]

[Text] The Soviet position is aimed at reaching agreement; it is revealed, properly speaking, in the Soviet Union's specific approach to the problems on the agenda of the Soviet-U.S. meeting. First and foremost, of course, this concerns the fundamental problem of curtailing the arms race and preventing the arms race from being transferred into space. The Soviet Union is in favor of banning the militarization of space. The Soviet Union is determined in its advocacy to implement measures — genuinely bold and wide-ranging measures — to reduce both strategic offensive weapons and also medium-range nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union has come to these negotiations with a strong position — a strong position not just in the sense that the Soviet Union is a strong power with a strong economy, a dynamic economy, with all the fresh solutions and fresh steps which are being taken to accelerate even further the rate at which economic and social tasks are being resolved in our country. The strength of this position consists of the fact that the Soviet Union is advancing proposals which are not egoistic, but which, in equal measure, take account not only of its own interests, but also the interests of its friends, the interests of the United States, the interests of other countries and the interests of universal security. This position is a profoundly moral one, aimed toward preserving the precious gift of life on earth. This cannot but yield results.

U.S. Lacks 'Good Will' in Disarmament Issue

LD182339 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 2000 GMT 18 Nov 85

[Konstantin Sorokin commentary]

[Text] The world pins much hope on the Soviet-American summit meeting in Geneva which opens on Tuesday. This is not surprising because the summit could see major steps towards a more stable and safer world. A consistent and steady reduction of nuclear confrontation in Europe is an acute problem that brooks no delay. The relatively small territory of the Old World counts for more than 20 percent of the nuclear stockpiles around the globe, or 10,000 charges, of which 2/3 belong to NATO. It is also in Europe that the main forces of the two biggest military and political alliances oppose each other. It is in this already explosive region that the United States is going to deliver a first nuclear strike and use its scripts of a limited nuclear conflict.

It's no accident that many military experts and politicians think that Europe, which has already been the main theater of two world wars, can become the source of a third one, which apparently would be also the last. General Harbottle of Britain has remarked that modern conditions do not allow for using the thesis put forward by the German theoretician Clausewitz, who said that war is a kind of politics but only by different means. Now that the nuclear charges stockpiled around the world can result in several thousand Hiroshimas, a war will spell the end of any politics.

Gen Harbottle's remark is especially true when applied to Europe. Experts have found that air nuclear explosions above 500 biggest cities will at once take a toll of 340 million lives; that's nearly 50 percent of Europe's population. In these conditions the only reasonable and sure way towards security in Europe and elsewhere is to work for a continued reduction of nuclear potentials in Europe. On the eve of the Geneva meeting, the Soviet Union has said it is prepared to scrap all nuclear weapons in Europe, both tactical and medium-range. As a first step it has suggested an agreement not linked directly to the strategic and space weapons by which its own and American intermediate-range nuclear means would be cut dramatically, and has also said it is prepared to start negotiations on this type of weapons with Britain and France.

The Soviet Union is entering the Geneva summit not only with a list of proposals but also of specific measures taken to lessen the nuclear threat in Europe. The Soviet Union's moratorium on the deployment of medium-range missiles in its European part is in effect. The number of SS-20 missiles has been reduced to the level of June last year when additional missiles of that kind began to be deployed in response to the appearance of American missiles near Soviet borders. At present the number of Soviet missile systems aimed against targets in Europe is much smaller than 10 or 15 years ago. It can be reduced still further if the United states shows good will and the desire to reach a fair agreement.

However, good will is something the Americans lack. The United States has forced the Netherlands into accepting the deployment of 48 cruise missiles. It has continued to prepare new missile bases. One such base is at Molesworth. The West German magazine *STERN* has said the deployment of Pershing-2 missiles in West Germany has been completed. As before, statements are being made that an arms race in space is inevitable. At the end of last week the defense and foreign ministers of seven West European countries, including Britain, sent messages to the White House with words of support for the American position at the Geneva summit.

Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Defense Secretary Michael Heseltine voiced similar feelings in their recent statements. Taking such a position amounts to supporting United States' attempts to turn the summit talks into a get-acquainted meeting and replace serious discussion of concrete problems with propaganda rhetoric to cover up the buildup of military threat.

U.S. Senators Urge No Compromise on SDI

LD182323 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1545 GMT 18 Nov 85

[From "The World Today" program presented by Igor Kudrin]

[Text] The opponents of arms limitation in the United States have made their usual attempt to hinder the achievement of fruitful results at the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting. On the eve of President Reagan's departure for Geneva, a group of right-wing senators sent him a letter containing an appeal to reject the possibility of any kind of compromise on the "star wars" program. The senators declared that offensive space weapons are too important for there to be an agreement on the limitation of their development and production.

Effects of Arms Race on W. Europe Viewed

Belitskiy Commentary

LD182354 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 2000 GMT 18 Nov 85

[Boris Belitskiy commentary]

[Excerpts] Success at Geneva would benefit not only people in the Soviet Union and the United States. It would benefit people in all countries, and Britain is certainly no exception in this respect. The benefits, moreover, would be numerous. The biggest of them would most certainly by the reduction in the danger of a nuclear war and the resulting sense of greater security. The fear of a nuclear holocaust would diminish and another ruinous spiral of the arms race would be averted.

But there is more to it than that. There are many indications that the soaring American military budget is causing the storm clouds of another recession to gather on the economic horizon. This was in fact stated quite recently by no other than David Stockman, a former director of the Office of Management and the Budget in the Reagan administration. The joyride is over, he proclaimed, and added that the time of sacrifices was coming. And the sacrifices in such cases, experience has shown, are shared by the countries most closely linked to the United States in the trade and economic fields. In other words, an unrestrained arms race while further enriching the military-industrial complex in the United States would, according to this expert — who is certainly in a position to know — plunge the economy as a whole both in the United States and in Western Europe into another recession, with a consequent further drop in British living standard.

Success at the Geneva summit beginning tomorrow would, on the other hand, help to initiate a new relaxation of international tensions. This would revive the political climate of the seventies, which brought with it not just greater security but also tangible economic benefits due to brisker East-West economic exchanges and trade.

The road to tomorrow's meeting in Geneva has, as everyone knows, not been an easy one. Whereas the Soviet Union has been putting forward bold new proposals for preventing an arms race

in outer space and radically reducing nuclear arms on earth, the United States, alas, has failed to match these initiatives. Indeed, it persists in its attempts to upset strategic stability and the rough parity existing between the two powers in military terms. And President Reagan's televised national address in preparation for the summit disappointed even REUTER's Washington correspondent Patricia Wilson, who reported that the speech promised little in the way of results and broke no new ground.

I understand that the World Council of Churches is arranging a 2-day prayer vigil in Geneva during the summit meeting. Well, according to the Oxford Dictionary of the English Language, to pray has not only a religious connotation but also a lay meaning of to hope for something fervently. This being so, I am sure that believers and nonbelievers alike will be praying for the success of this meeting according to their respective interpretations of that verb. And I do not doubt that these fervent hopes will be shared by everyone in Britain who treasures the peace of the world and all that it stands for.

Negotiating Position on W. Europe

LD181929 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1745 GMT 18 Nov 85

[From the 'International Diary' program presented by Vladimir Pashko; report from Geneva by international affairs journalist Nikolay Shishlin]

[Text] The U.S. delegation has developed quite a stormy propaganda activity. It holds briefings and news conferences every day in its center, the Intercontinental Hotel, trying to countereffect the profound impact made on the international public by speeches by Soviet experts and representatives of scientific and public circles in our country.

The argument splashed across the pages of the press is primarily concerned with problems concerning the halt of the arms race. The Soviet position appears very convincing. Indeed, let us turn to individual components of the range of problems under discussion in the framework of the struggle for halting the arms race as conducted by our country.

As far as strategic offensive and space armaments are concerned, the Soviet position is perfectly clear: The USSR comes out for a complete ban on space strike weapons and for a truly radical — a 50 percent — reduction of each other's nuclear armaments capable of reaching the territory of another country [as heard].

Naturally, one should also say something about the Soviet position on medium-range nuclear armaments in Europe. The USSR, as is known, proposes to conclude a separate agreement on this issue; such an approach meets the wishes of West Europeans halfway, since it takes the interests of their security into direct account. What has the USSR done in this area? I think, our listeners know about it, but nevertheless, I would like to remind them of it. The USSR believes that the contents of an agreement between the United States and the USSR on medium-range armaments, nuclear armaments, should be a suspension of deployment [razvertyvaniye] of medium-range missiles in Europe and drastic reduction of their number in a comparatively short period of time to an agreed level. But, at the same time, talks on a more radical agreement could be continuing.

And, having brought the Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe to zero, the USSR would be prepared to have exactly as many missiles here as Britain and France possess, counting the number of warheads. On this mutual basis, the USSR is prepared to free Europe of nuclear weapons altogether, both medium-range and tactical ones. In fact, these Soviet proposals have created an absolutely new situation, where there is the real possibility of a breakthrough toward military detente as well as political detente, which the USSR is making a stand for; amilitary detente which would immediately put the entire process of detente on a firm foundation. Moreover, it is of paramount importance now to make a first step, a first breakthrough, so completely new horizons will open up. The USSR's position appears to be an open position, a politically convincing and balanced position, as well as a promising one. And one can say here with certainty that the USSR has traversed its own part of the path toward reaching reasonable agreements; it has traversed it with great reserves of goodwill and great reserves of political courage and boldness. Now the outcome of these crucial and very serious talks in Geneva will largely depend on the United States displaying a real readiness to seek an actual improvement in its relations with the USSR.